But I believed that I had already given sufficient time to languages, and likewise to the reading of the writings of the ancients, to their histories and fables.
For Kaplan, the "worlds" involved in the first dimension are contexts of utterance: these can be seen as at least involving the specification of a speaker and a time and place of utterance, within a world.
Consider an expression such as: (1) I am hungry now According to Kaplan's analysis, when this expression is uttered by Joe at time t1, it expresses a proposition that is true if and only if Joe is hungry at t1.
Similarly, the character of 'now' maps any context into the time specified in that context.
In the most common two-dimensionalist treatments, a scenario is a centered world: an ordered triple of a possible world along with an individual and a time in that world.
If scenarios are understood as centered worlds, this will be a world centered on the speaker and the time of the utterance.
The individual and the time marked at the "center" of a centered world serve as a "you are here" marker, which serves to settle these claims about self-location.
For a given thinker, the hypothesis that a given centered world W is actual can be seen as the hypothesis: 'D is the case, I am F, and the current time is G', where D is a complete qualitative characterization of W, and F and G are qualitative descriptions that pick out the individual and the time at the center of W.
The like has been the endeavour of critics, logicians, and even politicians: nor have their attempts been wholly unsuccessful; though perhaps longer time, greater accuracy, and more ardent application may bring these sciences still nearer their perfection.
I believe it will readily be allowed, that the several distinct ideas of colour, which enter by the eye, or those of sound, which are conveyed by the ear, are really different from each other; though, at the same time, resembling.