If you think, that the appearances of things prove such causes, it is allowable for you to draw an inference concerning the existence of these causes.
I acknowledge, that, in the present order of things, virtue is attended with more peace of mind than vice, and meets with a more favourable reception from the world.
You tell me, indeed, that this disposition of things proceeds from intelligence and design.
But what must a philosopher think of those vain reasoners, who instead of regarding the present scene of things as the sole object of their contemplation, so far reverse the whole course of nature, as to render this life merely a passage to something farther; a porch, which leads to a greater, and vastly different building; a prologue, which serves only to introduce the piece, and give it more grace and propriety?
What I have said so far are really only obvious things, which I wanted to recall merely because they are important for what follows.
If I speak with no concern for modifying your behaviour or thoughts, I am not using language any less than if I say exactly the same things with such intention.
Yet certain things seem clear.
Let me nail down the point I have been making as tightly as I am able, even though this means anticipating certain things I shall have to say later on. To think of a system of qualities and relations is, I shall argue, to use symbols governed by a system of rules which, we might say, implicitly define these symbols by giving them a specific task to perform in the linguistic economy.
If there were such things as sense meaning rules (as opposed to verbal conditionings) how should they be formulated?
There are, of course, such things as mental actions, e.g. deliberating about what to do or trying to solve a mathematical problem.