Does this mean that meanings have no place within the process of communication itself, but only within its post hoc theoretical reflection?
It was this approach which seemed to provide the needed framework for making meanings explicit, by reconstructing them as set-theoretical objects.
The thesis advocated here is that the structure of an expression is essentially a quite different kind - it is a theoretical construct which locates the expression within the system of the language to which it belongs.
Every structure we ascribe to language and to individual expressions is the result of our theoretical reconstruction, and every theory is guided by a purpose.
Meaning is in this sense implicit to truth; and we can make it explicit ('explicate it') in that we make a theoretical reconstruction of language as a part-whole system and if we evaluate its 14 expression to make a compositional (recursive) characterization of truth .
But it is practical in another way: it greatly simplifies theoretical discourse about the language, through minimizing the terms and the forms of construction wherein the language consists.
These statements are felt, therefore, to have a sharper empirical reference than highly theoretical statements of physics or logic or ontology.
Theoretical computer scientists often distinguish between tail recursion and true recursion.
We conclude that on both empirical and theoretical grounds, the Minimalist Program is a very long shot.
Some theoretical terms (perhaps including microphysical terms) may be excluded, but information conveyed using these terms can instead be conveyed by the familiar Ramsey-sentence method, characterizing a network of entities and properties with appropriate causal/nomic connections to each other and to the observational and the phenomenal.