The answer is quite simple – it may be done with the help of a tool developed (it would seem) precisely to do this, namely a rule or a norm.
This simple turn seemed to have tremendous consequences for philosophy.
A simple example: linguists sometimes like to explain words like necessary simply by referring to possible worlds, whose real nature they take as something they need not bother very much about, because it is explained by philosophers.
However, even if there is no direct pointing at, the resolution seems to be quite simple.
One basically important thing concerning part-whole systems is that the partwhole structure offers the basis for induction: for a property to be instantiated by all the elements of a part-whole system, it is enough to be instantiated by all the simple elements (those which have no parts) and to be inherited from parts to wholes.
The precise inductive definition could run as follows: (basis) if e is simple, then either e is ea and then e[ea/eb]=eb, or e is not ea and then e[ea/eb]=e; and (induction step) if e=Oi(e1,.
In some simple artificial languages there can be truth without meaning; in a universal natural language comprising an infinite number of truths this is, however, not possible.
Alternatively we may, indeed, view the so-called rule as a conventional definition of a new simple symbol 'analytic-for-L0,' which might better be written untendentiously as 'K' so as not to seem to throw light on the interesting word "analytic.
Appeal to hypothetical languages of an artificially simple kind could conceivably bc useful in clarifying analyticity, if the mental or behavioral or cultural factors relevant to analyticity -- whatever they may be -- were somehow sketched into the simplified model.
Under certain circumstances one might be strongly tempted to do away with the simple use of "I".