Philosophy Concordance - online philosophical quotations

We are not given all the multiplications in the enumerative sense, but we are given all in one sense: any multiplication can be carried out according to rule.

In the first place, the impressions of the sense itself are faulty; for the sense both fails us and deceives us.

So it seems that diagrams offered by semantic analysts cannot be taken as descriptions of meanings in a direct sense (in the sense in which a photo is the description of the bearer of a name).

The seventh cause, where the sense is so charged with one object that it has no room for the admission of another, is almost wholly confined to the sense of smell and has little to do with the matter in hand.

Poverty, in any sense implying suffering, may be completely extinguished by the wisdom of society, combined with the good sense and providence of individuals.

Now let us be clear that we are not concerned here with synonymy in the sense of complete identity in psychological associations or poetic quality; indeed no two expressions are synonymous in such a sense.

Now it does make sense to say "There are seven 7's in the first 100 places", and although "There are seven 7's in the development" does not mean the same as the italicised sentence, one might maintain that it nevertheless makes sense since it follows from something which does make sense.

My sense is tied to the description "the inventor of the zip," while Jones's use is parasitic on mine: his sense is something like "dthat[the person Stalnaker was referring to with the name `Julius' on such and such an occasion]."

With regard to the fifth way in which objects escape the sense, it is obvious that the action of sense takes place in motion, and that motion takes place in time. If therefore the motion of any body be either so slow or so quick that it bears no proportion to the moments which the sense takes to act in, the object is not perceived at all, as in the motion of the hand of a clock and again in the motion of a musket ball.

In the first kind, where an object is imperceptible by reason of its distance, there is no way of manifesting it to the sense but by joining to it or substituting for it some other object which may challenge and strike the sense from a greater distance — as in communication by beacons, bells, and the like. In the second kind, this reduction or secondary manifestation is effected when objects that are concealed by the interposition of bodies within which they are enclosed and cannot conveniently be opened out are made manifest to the sense by means of those parts of them which lie on the surface, or make their way from the interior.