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Search results for phrase: scenarios

A primary intension is a function from scenarios to extensions.

Two-Dimensional Semantics, David Chalmers

http://consc.net/papers/twodim.html

T5) A sentence token S is a priori (epistemically necessary) iff the primary intension of S is true at all scenarios.

Two-Dimensional Semantics, David Chalmers

http://consc.net/papers/twodim.html

Other treatments of scenarios are possible (see Chalmers 2004), but I will use this understanding here.

Two-Dimensional Semantics, David Chalmers

http://consc.net/papers/twodim.html

If scenarios are understood as centered worlds, this will be a world centered on the speaker and the time of the utterance.

Two-Dimensional Semantics, David Chalmers

http://consc.net/papers/twodim.html

At other worlds and scenarios, however, the values of these intensions may diverge from the original extension, and from each other.

Two-Dimensional Semantics, David Chalmers

http://consc.net/papers/twodim.html

T7) A sentence token S is contingent a priori iff the primary intension of S is true at all scenarios but the secondary intension of S is false at some world.

Two-Dimensional Semantics, David Chalmers

http://consc.net/papers/twodim.html

On this approach, the scenarios that are in the domain of a primary intension do not represent contexts of utterance.

Two-Dimensional Semantics, David Chalmers

http://consc.net/papers/twodim.html

Scenarios are highly specific epistemic possibilities.

Two-Dimensional Semantics, David Chalmers

http://consc.net/papers/twodim.html

On the centered-worlds version of epistemic two-dimensionalism, scenarios are identified with centered worlds.

Two-Dimensional Semantics, David Chalmers

http://consc.net/papers/twodim.html

It is also possible to develop a version of epistemic two-dimensionalism where scenarios are more strongly dissociated from ordinary possible worlds (see Chalmers 2004; forthcoming a), and instead are characterized in more purely epistemic terms (for example, as maximal epistemically consistent sets of sentences in an idealized language).

Two-Dimensional Semantics, David Chalmers

http://consc.net/papers/twodim.html