Acceptance of such a change is tempting] because the description of a sensation does not contain a reference to either a person or a sense organ.
Nor is a body or an organ of sight necessary to the description of the visual field.
The idea that a visual field belongs essentially to an organ of sight or to a human body having this organ is not based on what is seen.
If we had a tube to our eyes and looked into a mirror, the idea of a perceiving organ could be dispensed with.
Similarly, Chomsky’s frequent use of the terms “language faculty” and “mental organ”3 underscore his belief that language is distinct from other cognitive abilities, and therefore distinct from the abilities of species that share those abilities but lack the ability to acquire languages.
Why then should the organ develop in the early stages of evolution?” (Chomsky, 1988, p.
Third, my claim about biological specialization, as seen in organ systems, is distinct from Fodor’s own notion of encapsulated modules, so the limitations of the latter are irrelevant.
But it does not speak against the mind as a network of subsystems that feed each other in criss-crossing but intelligible ways—the organ system metaphor on which HTMW is based.
Third, biological specialization, as seen in organ systems, is distinct from Fodorian encapsulated modules.
While the latter employs all the richest colours of his art, and gives his figures the most graceful and engaging airs; he must still carry his attention to the inward structure of the human body, the position of the muscles, the fabric of the bones, and the use and figure of every part or organ.