Philosophy Concordance - online philosophical quotations

Search results for phrase: natural

They speculate tentatively that natural kind terms (such as 'water') might be seen as abbreviated A-involving descriptions (such as 'the actual waterish stuff around here'), in which case necessary a posteriori identities such as 'water is H2O' may also be []-necessary and FA-contingent.

Two-Dimensional Semantics, David Chalmers

http://consc.net/papers/twodim.html

As defined here, FA-intensions are closely tied to apriority for some sentences: especially for A-involving sentences, and for tacitly A-involving sentences such as those involving descriptive names and perhaps natural kind terms (if these are indeed tacitly A-involving).

Two-Dimensional Semantics, David Chalmers

http://consc.net/papers/twodim.html

In the case of Davies and Humberstone, it holds only for A-involving expressions and tacitly A-involving expressions such as descriptive names and perhaps some natural kind terms.

Two-Dimensional Semantics, David Chalmers

http://consc.net/papers/twodim.html

Thesis (T2) says that the primary and secondary intensions of a complex expression depends on the primary and secondary intensions of its parts according to the natural compositional semantics.

Two-Dimensional Semantics, David Chalmers

http://consc.net/papers/twodim.html

Thesis (T3) states a natural connection between the intensions and the extension of an expression token.

Two-Dimensional Semantics, David Chalmers

http://consc.net/papers/twodim.html

But it is crucial to the two-dimensionalist position that typical a posteriori identities involving proper names or natural kind terms, such as 'Mark Twain is Samuel Clemens' or 'water is H2O', have a primary intension that is false in some scenario.

Two-Dimensional Semantics, David Chalmers

http://consc.net/papers/twodim.html

In the foregoing, a qualitative vocabulary is, to a first approximation, a vocabulary that is free of terms (such as names and natural kind terms) that give rise to Kripkean a posteriori necessities and a priori contingencies.

Two-Dimensional Semantics, David Chalmers

http://consc.net/papers/twodim.html

The same goes for many or most other terms, plausibly including most names or natural kind terms.

Two-Dimensional Semantics, David Chalmers

http://consc.net/papers/twodim.html

As before, a qualitative vocabulary is one that excludes terms, such as names and natural kind terms that give rise to Kripkean a posteriori necessities.

Two-Dimensional Semantics, David Chalmers

http://consc.net/papers/twodim.html

Primary intensions may also vary between different tokens of the same name (especially by different speakers), for different tokens of the same demonstrative (e.g. 'this' or 'that'), and perhaps also for different tokens of the same natural kind term.

Two-Dimensional Semantics, David Chalmers

http://consc.net/papers/twodim.html