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Something similar applies to natural kind terms such as 'water'.

So on Kaplan's analysis, names and natural kind terms have a "constant character" that is dissociated from their cognitive roles.

But for many other expressions, such as names and natural kind terms, cognitive significance is strongly dissociated from patterns of context-dependence.

So in these cases (and probably in analogous cases involving natural kind terms), deep necessity and deep intensions are not as strongly connected to cognitive significance or to apriority as in the case of descriptive names.

They speculate tentatively that natural kind terms (such as 'water') might be seen as abbreviated A-involving descriptions (such as 'the actual waterish stuff around here'), in which case necessary a posteriori identities such as 'water is H2O' may also be []-necessary and FA-contingent.

As defined here, FA-intensions are closely tied to apriority for some sentences: especially for A-involving sentences, and for tacitly A-involving sentences such as those involving descriptive names and perhaps natural kind terms (if these are indeed tacitly A-involving).

In the case of Davies and Humberstone, it holds only for A-involving expressions and tacitly A-involving expressions such as descriptive names and perhaps some natural kind terms.

But it is crucial to the two-dimensionalist position that typical a posteriori identities involving proper names or natural kind terms, such as 'Mark Twain is Samuel Clemens' or 'water is H2O', have a primary intension that is false in some scenario.

Something similar applies to kind identities such as 'water is H2O'.

In the foregoing, a qualitative vocabulary is, to a first approximation, a vocabulary that is free of terms (such as names and natural kind terms) that give rise to Kripkean a posteriori necessities and a priori contingencies.