On the whole, therefore, there is probably more to be learnt about human psychology from animals than about animal psychology from human beings; but this conclusion is one of degree, and must not be pressed beyond a point.
Its chief use is only to discover the constant and universal principles of human nature, by showing men in all varieties of circumstances and situations, and furnishing us with materials from which we may form our observations and become acquainted with the regular springs of human action and behaviour.
Were not the memory tenacious to a certain degree; had not men commonly an inclination to truth and a principle of probity; were they not sensible to shame, when detected in a falsehood: were not these, I say, discovered by experience to be qualities, inherent in human nature, we should never repose the least confidence in human testimony.
If we can know most about animals, we shall use this knowledge as a basis for inference about human beings; if we can know most about human beings, we shall adopt the opposite procedure.
What other human or non-human ability could it serve?
We add that many other conceptual systems, though not yet systematically studied in non-human primates, are conspicuous in human verbal interactions while being hard to discern in any aspect of primates’ naturalistic behavior.
Recursion is said to be human-specific, but no distinction is made between arbitrary recursive mathematical systems and the particular kinds of recursive phrase structure found in human languages.
Most experiments testing the perception of human speech by non-human animals have them discriminate pairs of speech sounds, often after extensive operant conditioning (supervised learning).
When thus attacked, the Epicureans have always answered, that it is not they, but their accusers, who represent human nature in a degrading light; since the accusation supposes human beings to be capable of no pleasures except those of which swine are capable.
And the sentiment of justice appears to me to be, the animal desire to repel or retaliate a hurt or damage to oneself, or to those with whom one sympathizes, widened so as to include all persons, by the human capacity of enlarged sympathy, and the human conception of intelligent self-interest.