Does it imply that semantic theory states no facts and hence is no genuine theory?
SemanticsW, on the other hand, addresses things which one knows when she knows language and something about the present state of the world: to know what the phrase the king of France refers to one has to know its meaning plus certain facts about France.
Meaning, in the ordinary sense of the word, is a matter of semanticsL - knowing meaning is a part of knowing language, not of knowing facts about the extralinguistic world.
It may not really tackle the praxis itself; for this praxis largely consists in collecting and cataloguing facts about language, and this is something that is largely independent of an 'ideologic' background.
On the other hand, even the most diehard realist has to assume that there are some contingent facts that elicit which meaning an individual expression has. We do not discover meaning by an 'intellectual trip' into a realm of abstracta where we would see them attached to expressions; but rather by observing and recording certain concreta.
However, the sagest abstract philosophical conception of language is empty if it does not reflect the facts of how language really works; and the most detailed atlas of the landscape of language is impotent if it is not clear which questions it purports to answer.
The Untenability of the Semiotic View Let us begin with neutral, commonly acceptable facts.
It is the language itself and the way we use it that is primary; meanings (as well as other linguistic abstracta) are only our means of representing these primary facts, of 'making sense' of them.
Let us, therefore, survey several important facts concerning part-whole relations and part-whole systems.
The lexicographer is an empirical scientist, whose business is the recording of antecedent facts; and if he glosses 'bachelor' as 'unmarried man' it is because of his belief that there is a relation of synonymy between these forms, implicit in general or preferred usage prior to his own work.