Intentionality is that property of many mental states and events by which they are directed at or about or of objects and states of affairs in the world" (ibid.
Accounting for these practices is methodologically and conceptually continuous with accounting for events in the non-human and inanimate world.
There is also no help in recourse to talking of 'neural events' or the like: it is true that these, unlike mental entities, are specifiable independently of the sentences whose usage they may accompany (at least in principle); however they are quite like thoughts in that if they are specified in this way, they cannot really provide us with meanings.
It is the occurrence of certain particular events or entities (the occurrence of certain contents within the heads of speakers, or the occurrence of certain utterances of speakers) which establishes the meaning of an expression15.
So stated, the doctrine remains ambiguous as between sense data as sensory events and sense data as sensory qualities; and it remains vague as to the admissible ways of compounding.
The ontology implicit in it (i.e., the range of values of its variables) embraced not only sensory events but classes, classes of classes, and so on.
The notion lingers that to each statement, or each synthetic statement, there is associated a unique range of possible sensory events such that the occurrence of any of them would add to the likelihood of truth of the statement, and that there is associated also another unique range of possible sensory events whose occurrence would detract from that likelihood.
If we look at a river in which numbered logs are floating, we can describe events on land with reference to these, e.g., "When the 105th log passed, I ate dinner".
Can time go on apart from events?
What is the criterion for time involved in "Events began 100 years ago and time began 200 years ago"?