Philosophy Concordance - online philosophical quotations

This semantic mentalism is often complemented with a kind of 'reduction axiom': everything mental is physical, every event in the mind is (in fact) an event in the underlying brain etc. This seems to guard against the suspicion that what is going on is the old mentalism which has been seriously challenged by so many philosophers - the structures which are studied are ultimately tangible structures of the human brain.

Or take the interesting results of the systematic investigations of the linguistic evidence for the count/mass, event/process or individual/stage distinctions.

But in this relation of "germaneness" I envisage nothing more than a loose association reflecting the relative likelihood, in practice, of our choosing one statement rather than another for revision in the event of recalcitrant experience.

Call this information time. In information time there will be past and future with respect to a particular day. And in memory time, with respect to an event, there will also be past and future.

For example, the words "before" and "after" mean something different according as one depends on memory or on documents to establish the time of an event.

It is based on such facts of experience as that closing one's lids is accompanied by an event in one's visual field, or the experience of raising one's arm towards one's eye. It is an experiential proposition that an eye sees.

How can one know whether an action or event has the quality of goodness?

For example, a mammalian circuit that uses onset asynchrony to distinguish two overlapping auditory events from one event with a complex timbre might be sufficient to discriminate voiced from unvoiced consonants (Bregman

Also, amid many opinions held in equal repute, I chose always the most moderate, as much for the reason that these are always the most convenient for practice, and probably the best (for all excess is generally vicious), as that, in the event of my falling into error, I might be at less distance from the truth than if, having chosen one of the extremes, it should turn out to be the other which I ought to have adopted.

Fodor claims that the problem of routing information to the appropriate reasoning system—for example, detecting that an event is an example of a social exchange in order to activate a cheater-detecting mechanism— requires nothing less than a full solution to the abduction problem, leaving us where we started: ‘Nobody has any idea what kind of cerebration is required for figuring out which distal stimulations are social exchanges’ (p. 76).