Philosophy Concordance - online philosophical quotations

To ask whether (3) is a reasonable semantic analysis is to ask whether DRS's can be put into correspondence with English sentences in such a way that (A) there is a 'reasonable' extent to which DRS's defined to imply (to be implied by) other DRS's correspond to sentences intuitively implying (being 13 Thus providing what Sellars (1974) calls their functional classification.

Custom is that principle, by which this correspondence has been effected; so necessary to the subsistence of our species, and the regulation of our conduct, in every circumstance and occurrence of human life. Had not the presence of an object, instantly excited the idea of those objects, commonly conjoined with it, all our knowledge must have been limited to the narrow sphere of our memory and senses; and we should never have been able to adjust means to ends, or employ our natural powers, either to the producing of good, or avoiding of evil.

None of their countrymen have a large correspondence, or sufficient credit and authority to contradict and beat down the delusion.

Chalmers, after noting a correspondence between the primary/secondary intension distinction and Kaplan's character/content distinction, points to some differences: "Kaplan uses his account to deal with indexical and demonstrative terms like "I" and "that," but does not extend it to deal with natural-kind terms such as "water," as he takes "water" to pick out H2O in all contexts."

The second, I would say, is the rehabilitation of the correspondence theory of truth, the rehabilitation of the idea that truth is simply correspondence with the facts.

Of the three main theories of truth, the oldest was the correspondence theory, the theory that truth is correspondence with the facts, or to put it more precisely, that a statement is true if (and only if) it corresponds to the facts, or if it adequately describes the facts.

Our problem is no longer: Is truth correspondence?

Our problem can be sharply formulated only by pointing out that the opponents of the correspondence theories all made an assertion.

They all asserted that there cannot be such a thing as the correspondence between a statement and a fact.

They say that this concept is meaningless (or that it is undefinable, which, incidentally, in my opinion does not matter, since definitions do not matter) In other words, the whole problem arises because of doubts, or scepticism, concerning correspondence: whether there is such a thing as a correspondence between a statement and a fact.