That same move, that same X-counts-as-Y-in-context-C move, by which you create desire-independent reasons for action in the case of the individual speech act, is now generalizable.
Sometimes we back them with physical force, in the case of the criminal law for example, but the police and armies are also systems of deontologies.
You can see this weakness in its most extreme form in the case of the picture theory of meaning.
It ignores the many aspects of grammar that are not recursive, such as phonology, morphology, case, agreement, and many properties of words.
They certainly cannot be shared via ostension, so in either case language is necessary for their cultural transmission.
The set of phonological structures of a language forms a “discrete infinity,” a property which, in the case of syntax, HCF identify as one of the hallmarks of language.
But there are no syllables built out of the combination of two or more full syllables, which is the crucial case for true recursion.
In the minimal case, a word is an arbitrary association of a chunk of phonology and a chunk of conceptual structure, stored in speakers’ long-term memory (the lexicon).
In any case, the conclusion that there are no mechanisms of learning or representation specific to words may be premature.
Markson and Bloom’s case that word learning can be reduced to a Theory of Mind mechanism is most tenable for the basic act of learning that a noun is the label for a perceptible object.